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Abstract 
This paper interrogates some prominent post-Marxist engagements with St Paul’s 
messianism by reading them in the theological context of the anti-historicist revival of 
Pauline eschatology in the twentieth century. In both readings, the means through 
which the critique of historicism is delivered is the revival of the eschatological core 
of Paul’s proclamation. Paul is read as inaugurating a ‘new world’ of freedom, love 
and redemptive hope as opposed to the ‘old world’ of oppression, sorrow, death and 
despair. And yet, it is exactly in such an apocalyptic reading of Pauline eschatology 
that both philosophical and theological critiques of historicism, despite protestations 
to the contrary, remain prisoners to the aporias of a historicist temporality. The 
symptom of the philosophers’ residual parasitism on historicism is expressed as 
antinomian negativism, while in the case of the theologians it can take the form of a 
self-assured Church triumphalism. 
 
Keywords: St Paul, eschatology, historicism, Alain Badiou, Slavoj Žižek, Giorgio 
Agamben, Henri de Lubac 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
There is little doubt that one of the most interesting -albeit, as usual, contested- 
developments in the philosophical study of the intersection between religion and 
politics in the last thirty years has been the appropriation of St Paul’s messianism by 
post-Marxist critics of global capitalism.1 In their effort to revitalize the emancipatory 
dimension of the Marxist legacy after the collapse of ‘really existing socialism’, 
several post-Marxist continental philosophers have turned to St Paul in search for a 
new model of dissident/revolutionary subjectivity. It suffices only to mention Jacques 
Derrida’s messianicity without messianism, Alain Badiou’s reading of Paul as a 
theorist of the Event, Slavoj Žižek’s reappreciation of kenotic Christianity and 
articulation of a Pauline materialism, and Giorgio Agamben’s imaginative 
engagement with Paul’s messianic temporality.2 The central concern of this renewed 
interest in Paul’s messianic imaginary seems to be the critique of Marxist historicism, 
i.e. a rigid interpretation of Marxist thought that views history as moving towards a 
predetermined telos and society operating according to iron-clad socio-economic laws 
destined to turn the very instruments of capitalist exploitation into the midwives of a 
society free from want and oppression.  
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Paul’s thought was ‘rediscovered’ as a useful ally against the naivety of historicist 
interpretations of Marxist revolutionism, despite the risk that Pauline messianism 
carries a theistic baggage which some might argue is more than a disposable part of 
the apostle’s message. Indeed, the distinctive feature of the aforementioned 
philosophical interventions is that they are explicitly informed by what Habermas 
would call ‘methodological atheism’. Namely, such an atheism is not an accidental 
dimension of their forays into religious thought, but rather a constitutive part of their 
approach to the truth of religion approached within the parameters of what they would 
recognise as our contemporary nihilist predicament. Apart from the fact that 
philosophy, in search of its own sense of autonomy, has always had a strenuous 
relationship with theology, post-Marxist philosophical readings of Paul tend to take 
their cue from a post-Nietzschean death-of-God sensibility3 or simply resonate with 
similar developments within theological studies, such as the rise of death-of-God 
theology in the early ‘60s, itself in many ways an offshoot of the encounter of modern 
theology with Nietzsche’s problematique of nihilism and concomitant critique of 
Christian theism.4 
 
At first glance, the fact that both the critique of metaphysical theism and that of 
developmental historicism seem to issue from the same anti-historicist impulse might 
strike as a bit odd. After all, Nietzsche’s critique of Western metaphysics and 
ontotheology owed a great deal to the nineteenth-century historicist Zeitgeist.5 And 
yet, employing historical thinking without reducing the past to an inventory of our 
epochal prejudices or to a propaedeutic for a progressive reading of history is no easy 
task. It is the aporias of such kind of historicism that not only philosophical but also 
theological engagements with Paul’s radical proclamation6 sought to unravel. While 
post-Marxists turned against twentieth-century rigid historicism in the form of 
orthodox Marxist determinism,7 theologians waged their own battle against the 
overwhelming influence of nineteenth-century critical-historical hermeneutics in 
biblical criticism, a task most vividly exemplified in the critique of David Strauss’ 
New Testament scholarship by the ‘History of Religions School’ 
(Religionsgeschichtliche Schule). In both readings, the revival of the eschatological 
core of Paul’s proclamation served as the means through which the critique of 
historicism was delivered. Paul was read as inaugurating a ‘new world’ of freedom, 
love and redemptive hope as opposed to the ‘old world’ of oppression, sorrow, death 
and despair. And yet, this paper argues that it is exactly in such an apocalyptic reading 
of Pauline eschatology that both philosophical and theological critiques of 
historicism, despite protestations to the contrary, remain prisoners to the aporias of a 
historicist temporality. The symptom of the philosophers’ residual parasitism on 
historicism is expressed as antinomian negativism, while in the case of the 
theologians it can take the form of a self-assured Church triumphalism.    
 
Paul’s antinomianism and the roots of modern anti-historicism 
 
In The Faith of the Faithless, Simon Critchley reminds us that the invocation of 
Paul’s name in politico-religious struggles was usually directed against the prevailing 
orthodoxy of the era.8 The apostle’s message was perceived as announcing the advent 
of a new order/creation (καινή κτίσις) through the revolutionary transformation of the 
old order.9 In theological parlance, Paul’s messianic call activates a complex 
dialectics of law and grace that does not seek to abolish the law but fulfil it, namely 
interpret it under a messianic light as something that conditions our relation to faith 
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and redemption. Yet, due to its inherent ambiguity and the unstable dialectics of law 
and its overcoming on which it rests, the Pauline message has been interpreted in 
various, sometimes diametrically opposed, ways: either as legitimizing the powers 
that be (Romans 13:1-3) or as entirely antinomian, opposed to the order of being 
which represents man’s sinfulness and constitutive imperfection (Galatians 3:10; 
Romans 3 and 7). The latter impulse has frequently been the inspiration behind 
reactions against the secularism, corruption and scholasticism of the established 
Church in favour of a return to the ‘authentic core’ of Christianity. What was usually 
implied when Paul’s dangerous legacy was evoked -as Luther’s case strongly 
exemplifies- was that the official Church was denounced as a nest of vipers in need of 
purification and reformation.10  
 
Indeed, Paul’s uncompromising spirit and radical messianism can be regarded as both 
deflecting and enacting the temptation of antinomian dualism (law, canonicity vs. 
redemption, messianicity) in religious thought. The antinomian impulse expresses the 
desire to be free of certain rigid structures within Christendom (e.g. established 
Church) or Judaism (e.g. the rabbinic Torah), inherited doctrine or, perhaps, even 
religion itself. Colby Dickinson has recently argued that antinomianism arises as a 
revolutionary or reform-oriented movement within a given normative framework and 
that it needs to be comprehended as a political challenge to rival authorities.11 
Dickinson gives examples of a series of antinomian thinkers who contested 
established interpretations of the Christian message or its mortified institutional 
expression: Johan Agricola’s antinomian rejection of Luther’s legitimist bias in favour 
of social order, the 19th century Reformers -particularly Calvinists- who sought 
justification by faith alone, or Kierkegaard’ critique of the ‘ethical’ structures of 
Christendom and his existential re-signification of religion as a ‘mad’ act of 
suspension of every given normativity (from the Torah to contemporary attitudes of 
religious piety as well as ecclesiastical/canonical structures).  
 
As Dickinson admits, the point here is not to label those attitudes antinomian per se 
since a number of those who could be described as antinomians -a broad group that 
for Dickinson includes Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Simon Weil and the great Protestant 
theologians Karl Barth and Paul Tillich- would reject the label. Rather, the point is ‘to 
stress that their theologies bore traces of this anti-structural, anti-institutional impulse 
that is hard to disentangle from ‘antinomian’ thought in general, whatever such a 
thing, in reality, actually is’.12 Dickinson, then, argues that the original Lutheran 
reformist intuition carries within it an antinomian impulse that harks back to the 
original Pauline declaration of a faith ‘in Christ’ that may de-stabilize, yet does not 
entirely do away with the institutionalized structures of the religious body out of 
which these desires spring:  
 
What these modern and even Pauline examples suggest to us is that the same 
‘antinomian’ impulse that once ignited the righteous vigor of Johann Agricola was 
probably something latent within Luther’s own objections to the Roman Catholic 
Church of his time, but which was, for Luther himself, something that necessarily 
needed to be tempered with structure and law in order for the Reformation to have 
any traction as an institutional movement in its own right. This would explain, on the 
one hand, why Luther had to resist such impulses, yet, on the other, why his own 
reforming tendencies were potentially mistaken as antinomian, why the antinomian 
impulse still refuses to go away and yet why it also cannot be embodied as a free-
standing ecclesiastical structure.13  
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As his own formulations belie, Dickinson arguably falls prey to an understanding of 
the antinomian impulse as a trans-historical dialectical structure that is programmed to 
make its appearance whenever existing ecclesiastical structures are rigidified or 
rendered obsolete. Antinomianism, then, for him represents the supra-historical 
healthy spirit of revolt and reformation that periodically breathes new life into old 
institutions. Apart from the fact that this strikes as a very Protestant understanding of 
antinomianism, it also reflects a specific theory of history underpinning Dickinson’s 
reading of the dialectical tension between history and redemption, law and grace, 
immanence and transcendence. Whenever antinomian dualism is turned into a rigid 
oppositional structure that expresses an implacable tension between the order of 
history/immanence and the order of eternity/transcendence, or of law vs. love, 
antinomianism assumes the form of the exception to an established order that is 
simultaneously included to it as its negation. One could be tempted here to observe 
that such a model of antinomianism exhibits structural similarities to the Schmittian 
logic of the political as the exception to a sovereign order that is both external and 
internal to its constitution.14 As will become clear in the next section, this Schmittian 
logic of the exception is one that is shared -yet also resisted- by philosophical readers 
of Paul. More specifically the next section will look at Paul’s messianic 
antinomianism as expressed in the readings of Badiou, Žižek and Agamben. First, 
however, one needs to establish the hermeneutic horizon within which, not only the 
philosophical appropriation of Paul’s message by post-Marxist philosophers became 
possible, but also the hermeneutic ‘prejudices’, to use a Gadamerian concept, 
underpinning their antinomian anti-historicism. In their case, these are a) Heidegger’s 
phenomenological rendition of Christian life and b) the messianic libertarian 
romanticism, to employ Michael Löwy’s felicitous coinage, of the early 20th century 
Jewish intelligentsia.15  
 
To begin with Heidegger, the Swabian existential philosopher engaged with Paul’s 
thinking at the early stages of his philosophical career when he was still struggling to 
formulate his own approach to the phenomenology of human experience. Heidegger 
reads Paul through phenomenological lenses with an eye on providing a descriptive-
analytical account of the fundamental structures that render experience intelligible in 
religious terms.16 Heidegger’s interpretive wager here is that religion -or, as 
Heidegger would put it, its ‘formal indications’- has something valuable to tell us 
about the fundamentals of human experience. Heidegger, as later post-Marxist anti-
historicists, was not interested in the ‘official’ Paul as the founder of institutional 
Christianity. He was rather interested in Paul’s eschatological message as a specific 
kind of temporal experience that is enacted in the mode of a proclamation. Paul, for 
Heidegger, emphasizes not the ‘what’ of faith but the ‘how’ of a lived experience that 
the new life in Christ inaugurates. Heidegger was not a historian, neither did he labour 
under the historicist illusion that he had some privileged access to what Paul was 
‘really doing’. On the contrary, he sought to recruit Paul’s thought as a counter-
cultural possibility for his own time, a critical resource against both the complacency 
of liberal Protestantism and what he regarded as the deadlocks of traditional 
metaphysics. Indeed, Heidegger’s reading of Paul and his own philosophical agenda 
and cultural criticism go hand in hand. Just as he read Western metaphysics as the 
degenerative, reified expression of an earlier Greek (pre-Socratic) encounter with 
Being as emergence (Ereignis), so did he regard Christian dogmatic history or the 
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‘Hellenization’ of Christianity as the forgetting or concealing of the original Pauline 
eschatology of ‘watchful anticipation’.  
 
Within an interpretive horizon whereby phenomenology becomes a secularized 
eschatology, Paul’s opposition between ‘flesh’ and ‘spirit’ is creatively reconstructed 
by Heidegger as denoting two different modes of being in the world, rather than an 
opposition between a physical condition and an otherworldly one. More specifically, 
the word ‘world’ in Heidegger’s phenomenological parlance is not a collection of 
objective items that make up what we understand as the cosmos, but a comportment, a 
way of relating to structures of meaning and intelligibility that condition human 
experience. Living according to the ‘flesh’ then, for Heidegger, would be living an 
inauthentic life that engages with the world as an object of possession, manipulation 
or mastery. Living according to the ‘spirit’ would rather enact the authentic life lived 
in ‘anxious concern’ (Sorge or Bekümmerung) and constant anticipation or 
watchfulness. Heidegger then seems to be juxtaposing an image of an uncorrupted 
primitive Christianity (Urchristentum) with the capitulated institutional Christianity of 
the post-Constantinian Church that had arguably abandoned its messianic 
vocation.17As we shall see, it is exactly this reappreciation of Paul’s antinomian 
messianism as the spirit of renewal of an ossified state of affairs that provides 
inspiration to the anti-historicism of Badiou, Žižek and Agamben.    
 
The other major influence on the recent philosophical appropriation of Pauline 
thought by post-Marxists, is a group of Jewish messianic Marxists that opposed 
nineteenth-century historicist thinking and philosophies of progress, liberal and 
socialist alike. If Heidegger turned against the liberal Protestantism of his time and 
positively influenced later Protestant and Catholic theologians, such as Bultmann, 
Rahner, Barth and Tillich, in their rediscovery of the eschatological dimension of the 
Christian message, Jewish revolutionary thinkers, such as Georg Lukács, Ernst Bloch, 
Gustav Landauer and Walter Benjamin, revolted against the bourgeois ideology of 
uninterrupted progress as well as Herman Cohen’s assimilationist project of a Judeo-
Christian cultural synthesis. In so doing, they recovered the messianic legacy in 
Jewish thought as a means to denouncing the capitulation of faith to culture and the 
close proximity of throne and altar. In his remarkable essay, ‘Towards an 
Understanding of the Messianic Idea in Judaism’, Gershom Scholem stresses the links 
between the Jewish messianic tradition and, what Löwy calls in his work, libertarian 
utopianism or radical anarchism.18 By libertarian utopianism, Löwy meant not only 
anarchist (or anarcho-syndicalist) doctrines in the narrow sense, but also the 
revolutionary trends in socialist thought. Löwy talks about ‘elective affinities’ 
between the apocalyptic character of Jewish theocratic anarchism and the subversive 
anti-capitalist romanticism of the Germanic-Jewish intelligentsia after the breakdown 
of the pre-World War One Jewish-Christian cultural consensus, typically exemplified 
in the work of Herman Cohen.19  
 
In her superb study of those she calls Jewish nominalists or ‘neo-Marcionites’, Agata 
Bielik-Robson recovers the philosophico-religious roots of the antinomian tendencies 
in the work of prominent Jewish intellectuals, such as Emmanuel Levinas, Jacob 
Taubes, Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber and Walter Benjamin.20 Antinomianism, for 
Bielik-Robson, marks the specificity of Jewish religious thought that seeks to break 
with the confined cyclical universe of the Greek cosmos and announces, not an 
Odyssean homecoming, but an Abrahamic exodus to a path of risky freedom and 
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revolutionary hope.21 The interesting dimension of Jewish antinomianism, whose 
paradigmatic biblical figure is Job, is that it is at once an act of individuation that 
appears as the presupposition for any real relation and communication with the divine 
and an act of rebellious defiance that relates to a psychic economy of evil 
enjoyment.22 It offers, then, no clear standards of distinction between the voice that 
calls for redemption and happiness, and the destructive death-drive that leads to an 
illusory sense of self-sufficiency, sin, and death. This ambiguity of Jewish messianic 
antinomianism is an underlying motif in philosophical approaches to Paul’s 
messianism, especially those that relate it to Lacanian psychoanalytical insights and 
the role of enjoyment in the constitution of political subjectivities.        
 
Paul and the post-Marxist critique of historicism 
 
Badiou, Žižek, and Agamben are avowed anti-historicists in the sense that they all 
envisage their revolutionary politics as a break with the poverty of philosophical 
rationalism, substituting the twists and turns, the ironies and contingencies of the 
historical process for any notion of historical telos or inevitability. But if this post-
Fukuyaman sensibility is precisely the interpretive horizon of the politics of our time, 
their anti-historicist critique is far from proposing an exit from what Derrida would 
call the ‘spirit of Marx’. Revolutionary dialectics and its anticipatory logic essentially 
become the vehicle of an immanentizing transcendence and the expression of a non-
linear temporality: the future is already here as an ever-open-to-be-activated 
potentiality, insofar as the revolutionary event can break through at any time. Far 
from existing in a parallel plane outside of time, the messianic locates the future in the 
visible here and now. 
 
This defence of an anti-historicist historical materialism has, of course, shaped the 
critique of orthodox Marxism at least since its inception in Georg Lukács’ History 
and Class Consciousness (1923).23 However, it is really only since the reception of 
Walter Benjamin’s explicit messianism in the 1970s, as elaborated in his ‘Theses on 
the Philosophy of History’ (1940), that an anti-historicist Marxism as a theoretically 
self-conscious –if heterogeneous– critical tradition is born.24 According to Benjamin, 
history is not based on the linear flow of ‘homogeneous, empty time’, but on an idea 
of time as something which can be interrupted, brought to a halt and ‘rebooted’, time 
and again. In his favourite manner, Benjamin uses an image to convey the presence of 
divine time, eternity, into human history, time: the ‘splinters’ or ‘chips’ of messianic 
time.25 This image denotes the possibility of politically recapitulating or recapturing 
in the present ‘lost causes’ or unredeemed struggles of the past that animate the 
historical discontinuum of the ‘tradition of the oppressed’. These possibilities cannot 
be intentionally activated since it is only by way of the ‘weak messianic power’ of the 
oppressed that they are enacted.26 This notion of a disruptive anti-historicist messianic 
openness operates beyond conventional dichotomies of activity and passivity, 
intentional acting and non-intentional contemplation as well as beyond theological 
apologetics or progressive narratives. It is, rather, an anti-teleological temporal 
constellation of past, present and future as now-time (Jetztzeit), which is the term 
Benjamin uses to indicate kairotic, i.e. interrupted, time pregnant with repoliticising 
possibilities as opposed to the linear, irreversible flow of homogeneous, empty time of 
historicism. 
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It needs, however, to be clarified what kind of theory of history is presupposed here 
by such a type of anti-historicism. Is the method of messianic nihilism proposed by 
Benjamin only a break with notions of temporality as dead, flat or homogeneous, or is 
it primarily a break with, and universal transformation of, mythical (regressive or 
progressive) or dialectical conceptions of history (whether conservative, liberal or 
Marxist)? The latter impulse turns against unidirectional conceptions of history and 
contemplates the messianic as an ‘interruption’ of the dynamics of secular capitalist 
progressivism. That is, in refusing to define the historical process as either flat, 
regressive or unquestionably progressive, the messianic event becomes identifiable 
with, or more precisely constitutive of, a revolutionary agency that stands in the 
moment and passage of the event’s interruption to redirect the historical process.27 
And yet, paradoxically the understanding of the messianic event as the exception that 
‘interrupts’ or unsettles the historical continuum can arguably be re-inscribed within 
the horizon of historicism since even the anti-historicist temporality of the messianic 
‘now-time’ seems to rely on the idea of the ‘other’ of history being asymptotic to the 
order of the historical.28 Strangely, then, the messianic, envisaged as an uncanny 
exceptionality or, in the vocabulary of this paper, as antinomian negativism, fails to 
escape the orbit of historicism, despite the very promising redefinition of temporality 
upon which it rests. It is the traces of such an antinomian exceptionality that one can 
detect, to larger or lesser degree, in the philosophical eschatologies of Badiou, Žižek 
and Agamben.    
 
Alain Badiou has made it abundantly clear that he is an adamant atheist. Yet, this 
denunciation is slightly misleading, since it is precisely the turn to the early-Christian 
subject of Paul’s writings that furnishes Badiou’s theory of the political subject with 
the subject who arises in fidelity to a cause. In the language of Christianity, faith –or 
fidelity for Badiou– is a gift that is continuously lost and re-gained as a condition of 
the universality of truth. What makes one a subject, for Badiou, is the unconditional 
commitment to what transcends one in its universal truthfulness. Badiou’s principal 
concern in his reading of Paul’s letters is to show, above all else, how Paul subtracts 
truth both from the fake/abstract universality of global capitalism and ‘from the 
communitarian grasp’ of identity politics and the proliferation of differences.29 For 
Badiou, in marking off the resurrection as the site of universal faith, of faith for all, 
Paul never allows any ‘legal categories to identify the subject’.30 In Pauline faith, 
there is ‘neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male 
nor female’. On this account, Paul considers all proselytes to Christianity as fully 
practising followers regardless of their gender, ethnicity, social status or cultural 
practice as is circumcision in the case of men. Yet, Badiou does not think that faith is 
the absolute negation of the law, but only of the law of the letter as opposed to the law 
of the spirit. Under the latter the subject is committed, in faith, to an account of law 
that addresses truth to all. In fact, to be a true subject of universality one has to 
transgress the letter of the law to embrace the infinity of love. The Pauline subject 
sustains its subjectivity, not by a fidelity to the letter of the law (performance of good 
deeds), but by declaring its faith to the infinite grace of the Event of resurrection. The 
nature of this event cannot be reduced to any pre-given rationality or legal 
instrumentality; neither can it be sustained solely by good works (it is not ‘waged’, in 
Badiou’s terminology). Rather, it is the work of faith and hope as patience and 
relentless striving ‘of the subject in process’.31 
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This latter point is crucial for Badiou’s understanding of universality and truth. 
Badiou does not invest faith with mythical dimensions (resurrection is a ‘fable’ in the 
sense of Michel de Certeau’s idea of fables as social practices, not something that 
belongs to the order of the unreal).32 Neither does he believe that it can be the object 
of justification through the pursuit of virtue or through submission to the ineffable 
demands of the divine. For Badiou, these injunctions are part of a discourse of (Judaic 
or Greek) mastery from which the Pauline faith declares itself disconnected. Badiou 
may not have a theory of the ‘remnant’, as Agamben does, yet he insists that the force 
of truth is made to be immanent to that which is ‘weak’, i.e. a universal call for 
fidelity to the resurrection-event as an authentic Truth-Event. The latter, for Badiou, is 
what instigates a radical new beginning and therefore, consequently, dissolves the old 
coordinates of subjectivity and social order. The Badiouan event embodies the 
messianic experience as the exception to the positivity of Being (‘the state of the 
situation’) which in Badiou is apriori equated with evil.33 In fact, evil, for Badiou, is 
any constraining factor that betrays the openness of the event, misrecognises its 
character or forcefully tries to objectify the truth.  A Truth-Event is, then, the break 
with any prevailing or normal ‘state of affairs’; a rupture that may strike without 
warning, and, as such, can occur in any situation that has been declared closed.  
 
On this score, Badiou uses Saint Paul to advance a formalist notion of truth-as-the-
void, in which truth subtracts itself, and empties itself out, from customary and 
everyday practices and beliefs. In subtracting truth from the givenness of a situation, 
truth is uncompromisingly opposed to the ‘reciprocal maintenance’ between abstract 
universality and identitarian particularism. That is, in being ‘indifferent’ to the given 
state of a situation, truth announces a new universalism premised on what the 
situation excludes, or what lies outside of its known coordinates. True universalism is 
active, proclamatory, irruptive, and as pleonastic and gratuitous as grace. Badiou’s 
formalism is further revealed in the nature of this declarative universalism that he sees 
encapsulated in the statement ‘Christ is resurrected’. Badiou is adamant that this 
statement does not appeal to a personal Messiah as the founding agent of a particular 
historico-religious community with a separate identity (even an identity that hollows 
out every other particular identity). Rather than focusing on Paul’s own preferred 
declaration of faith which seems to be ‘Christ is Lord’ (Kyrios Christos), Badiou 
disassociates the death of Christ from the Event of the resurrection and, thus, rejects 
the idea of a personal Messiah that brings historical time, death and life under His 
Lordship. His formalism has no need for an incarnate Messiah in the same way that 
his void universalism has no place for actual historical experience which for him is 
apriori equated with evil rather than brokenness. 
 
Žižek endorses Badiou in much of his defence and analysis of Paul, but, unlike 
Badiou, he insists that Christianity is to be taken seriously, making his contribution to 
the debate one more openly revolved around the articulation of a Pauline materialism. 
Christianity, for Žižek, -at least its ‘perverse core’ as he calls it- is not simply an 
empty shell that provides a time-honoured vocabulary that can be plundered for 
progressive purposes. Žizek believes that only by going through the radicality of the 
Christian experience as the self-voidance (kenosis) of a God who truly dies on the 
cross can one become a true historical materialist.34 Only through abandoning 
certainty in the benign telos of history or the inexorable laws of historical progress 
does one become a true revolutionary materialist. In this, Žižek’s anti-historicism 
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adopts a Blochian strategy: in order ‘to become a true dialectical materialist, one 
should go through the Christian experience’.35  
 
Like Badiou, Žižek begins his reflections on Paul by making the anti-historicist point 
that Paul is indifferent to the actual life and beliefs of the historical Jesus. For Paul, 
the only thing of importance is that Christ died on the cross and was resurrected. 
Echoing Badiou, Žižek then locates the distinctiveness of Pauline Christianity in the 
event of rupture with its Judaic origins. For, in the resurrection, the ‘new life’ has 
already arrived, thereby irreversibly shifting the Jewish God of the sublime beyond to 
the immanent God of the earthly ‘already’. Judaism reduces the promise of another 
life to a pure Otherness, a messianic promise which will never become fully present 
and actualized (in the way, for example, Derrida envisages the Messiah as always ‘to 
come’). On the contrary, for Christianity, the Messiah is here, he has arrived, the 
redeeming Event has already taken place. Still, the gap which sustains the messianic 
promise remains since the full realisation of that promise is not yet. In other words, 
the ‘new life’ of the resurrection dispels the interminableness of Jewish messianic 
hope, forcing the faithful to live up to the implications of the qualitatively new Event. 
At this point, Žižek supplements his Heideggerian insight with a Lacanian twist. The 
Pauline ‘weakness’, which for Žižek is the work of love, is not the denunciation of the 
Judaic law, but rather the undercutting of its obscene supplement (i.e. the logic of 
transgression that fuels the cycle of sin and guilt) that sustains its operation. Christ’s 
‘uncoupling’ (‘so if anyone is in Christ, there is a new creation; everything old has 
passed away’, B΄Cor. 5:16-7) ‘suspends not so much the explicit laws but, rather, 
their implicit spectral obscene supplement’.36 
 
Žižek’s interpretation captures the urgency and imminence of the Pauline ‘already’. 
What remains vital and dangerous about the Pauline irruption is precisely its 
perversity (‘faith through atheism’) and non-conformism (‘weakness as power’). 
Unlike in the modern Jesus-tradition or liberal Christianity, with its benign 
ecumenical message of social responsibility and bourgeois ethics, the centrality of the 
resurrection-event in Pauline Christianity is that it grounds faith as a struggling 
universality. The recourse to Pauline Christianity reconnects politics to the necessity 
of drawing a line in order to hold onto the possibility of an antagonistic universalism. 
The universal or the absolute is fragile, as Žižek puts it, ruptured from within; the One 
is severed from the Other and the All; totality is never all, but always non-all.37 Here, 
we are given a clearer picture, then, about what is politically at stake in Žižek’s 
adaptation of Badiou’s St Paul. A ‘weak’ universality (which in Badiou’s 
transgressive antinomianism is still tainted by a residue of Nietzschean ressentiment) 
is replaced by a fighting universalism: ‘The division introduced and sustained by the 
emancipatory (‘class’) struggle is not the one between the two particular classes of the 
Whole, but the one between the Whole-in-its-parts and its Remainder which, within 
the Particulars, stands for the Universal, for the Whole ‘as such’, as opposed to its 
parts’.38 In Žižek’s Rancierian optic, the agent of a fighting universalism is, actually, 
the remainder itself, ‘that which has no proper place in the ‘official’ universality 
grounded in exception’.39 
 
This leads Žižek to develop his own reflections on the Truth-Event as revolutionary 
praxis by way of adopting a very Lukacsian perspective on the idea of the Truth as 
contingency.40 In Lukács, the revolutionary act does not await its objective conditions 
of realisation. Rather, through the actions and intervention of the collective 
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revolutionary subject, history is not created ex nihilo, but its existing symbolic co-
ordinates are re-signified. Objective conditions do not constitute but the formal 
possibility of a revolutionary situation. Yet, revolution occurs when some individuals 
–or, even, a single individual– take the risk of jumping into that empty ‘space’ 
consciously affirming history’s contingency. This is what Žižek calls an authentic 
political ‘act’: a jump beyond the symbolic order, beyond the signifier’s security. The 
point here is not that Pauline Christianity, and Lukács thereby, share a political 
eschatology, but that, in Paul and in early Lukács, the time of the Event (in Paul the 
Parousia, in Lukács the hoped-for post-1917 revolution in Europe) cannot be 
announced, given the fundamental unpredictability of the messianic event. Here, 
Benjamin’s concept of ‘now-time’ (Jetztzeit) and his eighteenth thesis that ‘every 
second of time [is] the strait gate through which Messiah might enter’ serve as a direct 
inspiration for Žižek.  
 
However, it is exactly on this point that he may be parting ways with Paul’s messianic 
sensibility. Although the complex Pauline dialectics of the already/not yet are here 
employed to justify a view of revolutionary subjectivity irreducible to the ‘objective’ 
historical process, ‘which means that things can take a messianic turn, time can 
become ‘dense’, at any point’.41 Nevertheless, it can be argued that Paul’s 
proclamation enacts a more radical messianism positing a gap within messianic time 
itself after the Messiah has arrived. While Žižek’s revolutionary subjectivity captures 
the need for painstaking day-by-day work to bring about the messianic event without 
passively waiting for its realisation, the Pauline already/not yet operates within a 
transformative experience that is already under way mystically transfiguring time and 
creation. The point here is not to claim that Paul’s apocalyptic eschatology has a 
cosmic, pre-modern dimension, while Žižek’s revolutionary messianism is stubbornly 
modern or anti-mythical. Rather, the point is that Paul announces a new life that he 
labels ‘in Christ’, a life that is not characterised by the modernist logic of the 
break/Event/rupture (which still clings to a view of salvation as a miraculous 
intervention from the ‘outside’ into the dull, repetitive order of history),42 but by the 
experience of the defeat of death qua the inexorable logic of this world.  
 
In comparing faith to work and hope to active patience, Badiou and Žižek seem to be 
opting for an interpretation of Paul’s letters within what they believe to be an anti-
apocalyptic and anti-prophetic context. The letters, they insist, reveal the apostle to be 
primarily the modern-day equivalent of the militant ‘political strategist’, rather than 
an apocalyptic preacher of damnation or of the end of times. Paul is certainly not the 
harbinger of some Jewish apocalyptic vision of future catastrophe or Stoic 
conflagration (ekpyrōsis). Yet, his letters do not necessarily set apart the missionary 
from the apocalyptic, the prophetic and the political. Historical scholarship on Paul 
has indeed shown that prophetic and apocalyptic eschatology were interdependent 
narrative lines in the Jewish post-exilic and Second Temple eschatology which Paul 
was steeped in.43 This conjugation of the prophetic and the apocalyptic in Paul’s 
eschatology is central to his messianic understanding of history and temporality, a 
dimension duly captured in Agamben’s close reading of the opening lines of Paul’s 
letter to the Romans in his The Time That Remains.44 Indeed, in a manner similar to 
Jacob Taubes’ The Political Theology of Paul, Agamben seeks to restore Paul’s 
message to its proper apocalyptic and messianic dimensions.  
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Key to this, for Agamben, is how Paul inaugurates a new messianic temporality which 
the apostle calls the ‘time of the now [ho nūn kairos]’. For Agamben’s Paul, the ‘time 
of the now’ is the crucial ‘time that remains’ between the resurrection and the 
Parousia. More specifically, the messianic time is the operational time (the time that 
falls in the gap between chronotic and kairotic time), the time that time takes to end. 
As Agamben points out, there is a tendency to conflate the messianic, the prophetic 
and the apocalyptic. The apocalyptic and prophetic are usually focused on the 
eschaton qua the end of time -although it eludes Agamben that this is a rather limited 
understanding of the two terms. Messianic time, on the other hand, is not focused on 
the end of time at all (as if the messianic event contrasted with an autonomous 
historical continuum that it interrupts from the outside or is part of a linear process of 
salvation-history), but the time or the temporality of the end. Consequently, messianic 
time possesses a specificity that is quite different from the traditional apocalyptic 
eschaton. At this point, historical time contracts (ho kairos synestalmenos estin; 
A΄Cor. 7: 29) and begins to end or wither away until the time of the Parousia (the full 
presence of the Messiah). Messianic time, therefore, represents a cut in historical 
time. By dividing the old age from the world to come, it introduces a remainder into 
historical time –the ‘time that is now’– that re-divides the division between past and 
future.  
 
For Agamben, this represents the true meaning of Paul’s universalism. Because the 
messianic event is ‘already’ and the full content of the messianic is ‘not yet’, what is 
opened up by the messianic event –the fact that division between the sexes or the 
nations or between (wo)men and God no longer exists– means that no universal 
identity is available to men and women, Jews and Greeks, until the Parousia fulfils the 
original messianic event. The messianic vocation, then, separates every identity from 
itself (Jew from Jew, Jew from non-Jew, Greek from Greek, Greek from non-Greek 
etc.), founding true universality on the promise of a ‘new age’ that has already begun. 
This idea of the universal as the internal gap that prevents any identity from 
coinciding with itself is, for Agamben, the quintessence of the Pauline vocation: to 
live in the messianic is to live without identity under the form of the ‘as not [hōs me]’ 
(A΄Cor. 7: 29-32). Obviously, there is an affinity here with Badiou’s reading of 
‘weakness’ as the indictment of the ‘mastery’ of Jewish priests and Greek 
philosophers but, nonetheless, Agamben’s antinomianism is very different from 
Badiou’s. In contradistinction to Badiou’s formalist fascination with the resurrection-
event as a ‘pure beginning’, Agamben is much closer here to recent scholarship on 
Paul that stresses the Judaic context of Paul’s writings and the continuity between 
Jewish law and the Abrahamic covenant. For Agamben, to live in the Pauline 
messianic is not to live outside the law, or even to question its ultimate authority, but 
to suspend the operation of the law, to render it inoperative. One does not usher into 
the new age through the absolute negation of the law but, in a sense, through 
suspending the law’s coercive character (Žižek’s obscene supplement) in order to 
fulfil the true content of the law which is love: ‘The law can be brought to fulfilment 
only if it is first restored to the inoperativity of power’.45 
  
What would be scandalous to the Jews, however, is Paul’s proclamation of the ‘age to 
come’ as already having arrived. In this light, as the first Jewish theologian of 
inaugurated eschatology -as opposed to traditional Jewish realised eschatology- Paul 
conjoins the ‘already’ and the ‘to come’, rather than keeping them separate, giving a 
new content to the confluence of prophetic and apocalyptic eschatology in Jewish 
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thought. As Roberts puts it, ‘after the Christ-event, far from living solely in a ‘new 
age’, believers are held to be living in two ages simultaneously. The ‘new creation’ of 
the Christ-event, therefore, is not creation ex nihilo (in Badiou’s language) but a 
redemption, transformation and completion of the ‘old age’’.46 Thus, while Badiou’s 
formalism seems to be re-inscribing Paul’s eschatology back into the two-age dualism 
of conventional apocalyptic thought alienating Paul from his Jewish messianic 
context, Agamben (and Žižek) seem(s) to be more faithful to the image of Paul as an 
engaged missionary that exhibits no contempt for this world, the latter being precisely 
the trademark of two-age dualism. Agamben’ anti-historicism, then, appears to be a 
lot more consistent with a conception of messianic time that undermines the 
autonomy of the historical/secular time. In insisting on the messianic context of Paul’s 
writings, the apocalyptic divisions between ‘the already’, the ‘not yet’ and the ‘to 
come’ are given a temporal interdependence. The simultaneous, yet non-coincidental, 
time of the ‘old age’ and the ‘new age’ is a time that focuses neither on the end nor on 
the present or past, but on how their interrelation redefines time’s linearity and 
directionality. There is no split of history in two in St Paul (as in Badiou’s reading), 
but, on the contrary, a move across, between and within the cut. What is distinctive 
about this Agambenian de-temporalizing and re-temporalizing logic of the messianic 
is not only that it introduces a cut in history but that it, actually, founds a science of 
history. In other words, Agamben realises that it is not enough for an anti-historicist 
argument to be opposed to the status-quo or reject teleology, it also has to incorporate 
an anti-historicist understanding of temporality/historicity.   
 
The theological revival of Paul’s eschatology  
 
Agamben’s reconstruction of messianic temporality, by his own admission, owes a 
great deal to Benjamin’s theory of history as the fulfilment of the past in the present. 
Agamben indeed believes that the radical Pauline double cut (‘old age’/‘new age’, 
‘flesh’/‘spirit’) is restored to its original Judaic context in the late writings of Walter 
Benjamin: ‘[N]othing that has ever happened should be regarded as lost for history. 
To be sure, only a redeemed mankind receives the fullness of its past –which is to say, 
only a redeemed mankind has its past become citable in all its moments…and that day 
is Judgement Day’.47  Or, as Agamben writes, ‘an instant of the past and an instant of 
the present are united in a constellation where the present is able to recognize the 
meaning of the past and the past therein finds its meaning and fulfilment’.48 The 
Pauline ‘already’ and ‘not yet’ are here held in tension against a horizon of historicity 
that understands the eschatological, not as a parallel or asymptotic dimension to the 
historical plane (as, for example, the early Benjamin of the ‘Fragment’ used to think), 
but rather as the possibility of transcendence within immanence. Agamben’s 
Benjaminian anti-historicism is, therefore, closer to -yet not always entirely in line 
with- Paul’s historical sensibility informed by the conjoining of prophetic and 
apocalyptic eschatology. Such a confluence reads redemption, not as a remote event 
to be enjoyed in the future, but as the ever-possible restoration of the present in the 
dimension of its fulfilment.49 
   
Agamben’s reading, however, also builds on the rich twentieth-century revaluation of 
the eschatological core of Paul’s message born as a reaction to liberal Protestantism’s 
tendencies to either ‘historicize’ or ‘liberalize’ Paul qua the founder of Orthodox 
Christianity. As Paul scholarship has established, the orthodox ‘Christian origins’ 
narrative about Paul and modern Christian ecclesiastical practice has tended either to 
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normalise Paul’s eschatological radicalism or dilute his message within the 
hermeneutical tradition of supersessionism.50 As such, Paul’s theology has assumed 
within Christian tradition the status of a ‘revealed doctrine’ reducing the core theme 
of his ‘glad tidings’ –salvation for all through the birth, death and resurrection of 
Jesus Christ– to a matter of truth as an apodictic discourse of objectivity, rather than a 
way of life that is revealed in the example of the life, death and resurrection of Jesus 
Christ. In contrast, specialist Paul scholarship seems to agree that the apostle’s 
thought in his letters is rather directed and framed by spiritual demands that are 
grounded in a politics of transition from the ‘old’ Israel to the ‘new’ ecclesiastic 
community, from the old order of Judaic law to the new order of messianic love, a 
transition that in theological terminology is called Apocalypsis Theou.51 
 
Paul scholars tend to identify the latter view as ‘apocalyptic’, distinguished by its 
emphasis on the ‘eschatological reserve’ pervading Paul’s message.52 Although the 
rediscovery of eschatology was inaugurated in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries with the work of Johannes Weiss and Albert Schweitzer, the wider 
acceptance of Paul as an apocalyptic thinker is the fruit of Karl Barth’s separate but 
parallel work.53 As the popularity of Barth’s view of divine revelation breaking into 
human history through Christ began to take hold in wider theological circles, it 
became easier to see this apocalyptic perspective in Paul’s letters as well.54 While 
prominent New Testament scholars, such as Rudolf Bultmann, were influenced by 
Barth, it was Bultmann’s student, Ernst Käsemann, who popularized this perspective. 
Käsemann primarily grounded his understanding of the ‘apocalyptic’ on God’s act in 
Christ to establish his Lordship over the world and over the evil powers controlling it. 
The culmination of God’s apocalyptic activity would arrive at Christ’s imminent 
return as the kingdom of God was universalized and Christ’s Lordship came to 
encompass the entire cosmos. 
 
The upshot of the above argument is that without the rupture of apocalypticism the 
resurrection-event becomes simply a docetic miracle: an event that appears in history 
without affecting its direction. Contrastingly, with the rupture of apocalypticism it 
becomes an event for the sake of history’s transformation. Hence Jesus’s resurrection, 
for Paul, has massive eschatological significance. In its proleptic disruption of 
historical time, it inaugurates the advent of a new creation that is not perceived as 
something destructive of the ‘world’ -understood positively as God’s creation- but 
only of the ‘world’ of Satan’s enslaving reign through sin/death. Hence, for Paul, 
there is no contradiction between apocalypticism and the contingencies and daily 
demands of missionary strategy (reflected in the context-specific character of the 
letters themselves). Indeed, for Paul, the belief in the imminent coming of Christ, 
consciousness of the end of history, and the transformation of history, are all 
intimately interwoven exactly because he does not entertain a notion of history as a 
separate order unrelated to God’s initial promise to Abraham and active commitment 
to his creation (the incarnation being the supreme act of fidelity to this relationship).  
 
And yet, while Paul specialists or historians of theology could claim that Paul would 
not have recognised the relevance or perhaps the ‘regime of historicity’, to use 
François Hartog’s apt term,55 behind the nineteenth-century search for the ‘historical 
Jesus’ in the work of David Strauss or Ernest Renan. Nevertheless, neither would the 
need to react to such an excessive historicism with a countervailing emphasis on the 
apocalyptic character of the Christian message -such as those found in Albert 
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Schweitzer’s critique of Biblical studies historicism, Ernst Käseman’s famous 
declaration that the ‘apocalyptic is the mother of all Christian theology’, and, above 
all, Karl Barth’s crisis theology56- arguably be part of Paul’s symbolic horizon. Even 
the slightest fissure between the historical and the eschatological/apocalyptic57 would 
have probably been foreign to Paul’s figurative historical imagination. Such a fissure 
would rather reflect a nominalist vision of temporality and historicity that the apostle 
could not have had access to. For the doyens of Radical Orthodoxy, for instance, this 
dichotomy between profane history and eschatology is the result of modernity’s 
rupture with forms of historical experience that used to recognise no autonomy or 
self-sustainability to the ‘historical’ or ‘natural’ as opposed to the ‘spiritual’ but rather 
relied on a sacramental view of reality bringing together the worldly and the 
eschatological as a transimmanent mode of living participation in the infinite 
differentiation of the Trinity itself.58 
 
An illuminating reconstruction of the conditions that led to the separation between the 
plane of immanence and that of transcendence, or the order of history (secular time) 
and the ‘other’ of history (eternity) -as a radically heterogeneous temporality that 
either remains asymptotic or indifferent to history or invades it from outside as a 
miraculous force of disruption- is offered in the work of the Catholic Nouvelle 
Theologie historian of theology, Henri de Lubac. De Lubac’s account of the gradual 
autonomisation of a concept of nature as separate from grace in his celebrated 
monograph, Surnaturel (1946), and his rumination on the thinning-out of the concept 
of mystery during the high Middle Ages in his equally famous work on the Corpus 
Mysticum (1944), shed light on alternative conceptions of the relationship between 
finitude and eternity that underpinned early Christianity’s sacramental temporality.59 
For de Lubac, early Christians would never have thought of the Church as a separate 
‘historical entity’, a sociological institution distinct from the mystical communion of 
believers with Christ that grounds its operation. They would rather have thought of 
the Eucharist as that sacrament of communion with Christ's body, now ascended to 
heaven, but really and mystically present in the one true Church.60 The Church 
receives its institutional life, its reality, as a gift of grace precisely because it receives 
Christ's mystical presence in the Eucharist. Therefore, corpus mysticum would not 
have been thought as referring to ‘the body of believers’ as a separate institutional 
entity. The Church was mystically related to the Eucharist as the corpus mysticum. 
That said, Christians of the first millennium could make distinctions between Christ's 
historical body, his sacramental or mystical body, and his true, ecclesial body. Yet, it 
is in the making of these distinctions that the term gained some ‘freedom of 
movement’ that would later alter its meaning and turn it into an abstract fiction 
serving the legitimation of ecclesiastical power claims once it was unhinged from the 
liturgical sphere.61  
 
This development constituted, for de Lubac, an impoverishment of the idea of 
‘mystery’ itself. The Eucharist was now thought to be ‘an objective Real Presence 
produced by the intervention of an extrinsic miracle…[and] the church simply a 
hierarchy channelling this intervention’.62 De Lubac was instead -one could say with 
Jennifer Rust- arguing for a performative rather than static understanding of the 
‘mystical.’ In this performative sense, then, the ‘mystical’ does not simply signify the 
superimposition of one discrete entity over against the other (Church vs. sacrament), 
but rather evokes a state of affairs in which the relation between the two is ceaselessly 
dynamic in line with the true meaning of the word ‘mystery’ which, for de Lubac, 
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expressed -in the pagan sense of the word- a form of praxis, ‘more of an action than a 
thing’, a way of life and a communal experience, rather than a supernatural, magical 
intervention.63 This dimension of an invisibility which is visible - not as a thing or a 
fictional representation of a transcendent beyond, but as a transimmanent 
comportment, a genuinely incarnate spirit - is de Lubac’s path to conceptualising the 
Christian eschatological ‘already’, i.e. the mystical dimension  of the ongoing 
transformation of the world, without falling to some kind of ‘bad faith’ mysticism that 
views the whole process either as a Gnostic fidelity to a metaphysical dualism or a 
pantheistic immanentism that dissolves the eschatological tension with the ‘not yet’.  
 
In his latest translated work on the Mystery of Evil, Agamben makes a similar point -
although he typically does not cite the Jesuit theologian- about the theatrical origins of 
the word ‘mystery’ and its association with Greek pagan mysteries. Like de Lubac, 
Agamben points to the performative dimension of the notion that did not use to 
convey the meaning of a secret doctrine, but rather that of a historical drama that 
separates the initiated from the uninitiated, the ones who participate in the theatre of 
salvation from those who do not understand the world as divine play: ‘[t]he term 
mystērion indicates a praxis, an action of a drama in the theatrical sense of the term as 
well, that is, a set of gestures, acts, and words through which a divine action or 
passion is efficaciously actualized in the world and time for the salvation of those who 
participate in it’.64 Finally, again like de Lubac, Agamben is well aware that the 
Church lives out the Pauline already through the liturgy that concretises, as a dramatic 
act of participation in the new life in Christ, the messianic mystery: ‘In the time of the 
end, mystery and history correspond without remainder’.65 Agamben openly sides 
with those theological contributions of the last century (Barth, Moltmann, von 
Balthasar) that argued for the revival of the eschatological spirit of the Church 
nineteenth-century historicist biblical criticism had rejected as mythology or 
superstition. Like Weiss and Schweitzer who restored the eschatological orientation 
of the Christian message, Agamben laments the fact that, to quote Troeltsch, the 
Church in practice, if not in doctrine, had closed the eschatological shop.66 Instead, he 
pleads for a return to ‘the eschatological experience of its historical action -of all 
historical action- as a drama in which the decisive conflict is always under way’. 
Eschatology is here taken to be a model for genuine historical action, one that does 
not submit to the economy of the eternal governance of things -which Agamben 
identifies with ‘hell’67- but takes every moment as a decisive call to action where 
everything is at stake and where ‘all are called to play their part without reservation 
and without ambiguity’.68     
 
Agamben’s revaluation of eschatology issues an indictment against those who have 
downplayed the eschatological thrust of the Christian message which resulted in evil 
(the mystery of lawlessness) being turned into an ontological reality. He invokes 
Paul’s disputed Second Letter to the Thessalonians and the obscure figure of the 
katechon introduced therein to show that the Schmittian interpretation that takes the 
state to be the restrainer of chaos, but also the one who delays the end of days, is only 
the mirror image of the naturalism of evil. The State or the Church, when assuming 
the role of Dostoyevsky’s Grand Inquisitor, are content with the perpetual deferral of 
the end of days – ‘‘Go and do not come again’, the Grand Inquisitor says to Christ’.69 
In contrast, Agamben turns to Augustine and another important theologian of the 4th 
century that was a major influence on Augustine, Tychonius. Tychonius came up with 
the idea of the Church as res permixta, not the huddle of the elect but a community 
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that includes both saints and sinners, both the good and the bad seed in its ranks. For 
Agamben, behind Augustine’s eschatological understanding of the two cities lies 
Tychonius’ idea that the one city was a mixture of the wheat and the chaff. Augustine 
does not map the two cities out in space, but rather projects them across time. The 
reason that Augustine is compelled to speak of two cities is not because there are 
some human pursuits that are properly terrestrial and others that pertain to God (rather 
they all use the same things), but simply because God saves in time (again the 
paradoxical abridgment of time and eternity). Christ has triumphed over the 
principalities and powers, but there remains resistance to Christ’s saving action. The 
two cities are not the sacred and the profane spheres of life. The two cities are the 
already and the not yet of the Kingdom of God. 
         
William Cavanaugh makes the similar point that Augustine is misunderstood if sin 
takes on the status of a given reality that then necessitates the violence of a 
permanent, natural political sphere, the state. Where this move is made, it tends either 
to de-historicize the already of the Kingdom of God or argue for a ‘balance’ between 
the already and the not yet. For Augustine, however, the already is not a transcendent 
principle but a mystery as historical praxis to which the Church is a witness (literally 
what the Greek word martyr means). Thus, the already and the not yet are not to be 
‘balanced’ any more than the city of God and the earthly city are to keep each other in 
check. For Cavanaugh,  
 
‘the reality of the already and the not yet is not a kind of Stoic admonition to seek 
moderation, a middle course between the contrasting passions of optimism and 
pessimism. The advent of the Kingdom of God is not balanced by any countervailing 
principle; Christ has definitively triumphed, and the powers and principalities are 
passing away. The reason that the Kingdom is not yet fully consummated is not that 
God is holding back, as if God would want the Kingdom to be revealed only partially, 
in anticipation…[t]he not yet results not from God holding back, but from humans 
holding back. And there is nothing “natural” or fated about human sin. Indeed, the 
story of the Fall makes clear that human sin is not the way it is meant to be, nor 
indeed the way that it really is.70  
 
And yet, despite their common aversion to the ontologisation of evil, the difference 
between Cavanaugh’s eschatological tension and Agamben’s mystērion reflects a 
perhaps imperceptible but significant disparity in their reading of historicity. For the 
former, the Kingdom is already present, Christ’s victory over death is the only reality. 
The violence of the not yet, expressed in the violent death of the martyrs, is exposed 
as belonging to a type of rule that is passing away.71 In their imitation of Christ, the 
martyrs become the icons of the new age that provide the key to reading and 
performing history eschatologically. However, their death is already declared a 
victory. It is as if there is no more risk or undecidability, no perception of a dramatic 
action staking everything out, as Agamben would imagine it. The historical drama is 
already structured, not by the economy of mystery, but by the mystery of the economy 
qua God’s salvation plan that guarantees the benign consummation of all things. From 
a promising recalibration of the relationship between time, history and eternity, the 
eschatological becomes yet again the point of departure from a temporal, finite world 
to a pre-ordained eternal heaven. Apocalyptic ontological dualism returns from the 
back door whereby eschatology becomes the a-temporal ‘background reality’ 
disconnected from the doctrine of creation, the latter now regarded not as an ongoing 
and genuinely kenotic act of divine dispensation and a divine-human dialogic 
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partnership, but ‘as the reality within which our world and its history exists’.72 
Instead, true eschatology cannot dismiss the created world and its history since 
finitude and creatureliness are not ‘defects’ to be superseded in the world to come. If 
so, eschatology can only be a re-doubling of protology, i.e. an affirmation that all 
‘first things’ were created good including all those fundamental features of the human 
condition that are routinely yet misleadingly considered deficiencies or ‘evil’, such as 
vulnerability, fragility and mortality.    
 
Conclusion 
 
Philosophical approaches to Paul’s messianism by post-Marxist anti-historicists seem 
to share in a radical gesture of freedom-as-contraction from worldly determinations 
that informs their antinomian inclinations. Badiou’s evental formalism, Žižek’s death-
drive and (up to a point) Agamben’s messianic nihilism revolve around this break 
with the given ‘state of affairs’ -be it the Judaic law as operative power, its obscene 
superego supplement or economic theology. Their anti-historicist impulse also reflects 
the Heidegger-like invitation to abandon oneself to the contingencies of history 
without safety nets or apriori expectations and the ‘Jewish’ messianic gesture of 
breaking the mythic cycle of a natural order of things. Yet, Badiou and Žižek may still 
be viewed as remaining wedded to the residues of a recalcitrant historicism that 
sustains their revolutionary dreams qua evental breaks with the order of historicity. 
Agamben’s reformulation of historical temporality through his creative re-
appropriation of Benjaminian and Pauline messianisms reflects his awareness that a 
successful confrontation with historicism necessarily involves a recasting of the 
relationship between the temporalities of history and eternity. His formulations are not 
always felicitous, and he often runs the risk of postulating an unbridgeable rift 
between an eschatological messianism and the hell-like governance of worldly things.  
It is for this reason that theologians would find such a radical antinomianism, in the 
form of either a commitment to axiomatic immanentism or their rejection of theistic 
transcendence, disappointingly lacking in appreciation of the mystery of the world’s 
ongoing transformation.  
 
At the same time, however, theologians seem to rest too comfortably in their 
professional laurels. Their presumption to sit in judgement of the philosophers 
‘without engaging the urgent contemporary context in which the philosophers seek to 
make their intervention, seems more than ungracious’.73 It also seems rather self-
defeating as their triumphalism stands in the way of the most promising insights 
furnished by the revival of eschatology in the twentieth-century. At least Agamben 
has understood that well. To be fair, some theologians and biblical scholars have also 
understood it very well and have thus been open to a creative interaction with 
philosophical insights rejecting attitudes of ‘theoretical imperialism’ and ‘epistemic 
privilege’.74 To the extent that theology and politics share a common interest in the 
investigation of alternative temporalities that would dismantle the machine of 
historicism, their students should be open to cross-pollination. Both might then 
transform themselves in the process. The theological might discover in the political 
the lost ethos of humility and the political might reclaim from the theological the 
much-maligned virtue of hope.             
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